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Jay Wright Forrester was an American engineer and management thinker. He 
founded System Dynamics, an approach based on computer modelling which argu-
ably has done more than any other method to provide a practical and realistic analy-
sis of change processes in systems. System Dynamics (SD) has been taken up across 
the world, initially by Forrester’s students and colleagues, but increasingly by a 
much wider community. It has had profound and influential applications in a range 
of fields, most prominently organisational management, urban planning and envi-
ronmental policy. Forrester summed up his concerns and his understanding of SD in 
an ‘elevator pitch’ (a statement short enough to be spoken in an elevator ride) on an 
email list:
System dynamics deals with how things change through time, which includes most of what 
most people find important. It uses computer simulation to take the knowledge we already 
have about details in the world around us and to show why our social and physical systems 
behave the way they do. System dynamics demonstrates how most of our own decision- 
making policies are the cause of the problems that we usually blame on others, and how to 
identify policies we can follow to improve our situation. (Forrester 1997)
Jay Forrester was born in 1918  in rural Nebraska, in the midwestern United 
States, and died in 2016 near Boston. He grew up on a cattle ranch where he had the 
experience that “in an agricultural setting, life must be very practical. It is not theo-
retical; nor is it conceptual without purpose. It is full-time immersion in the real 
world” (Forrester 2007a, p. 345). Although he considered continuing in agriculture, 
he took his undergraduate degree in electrical engineering at the University of 
Nebraska, graduating in 1939. This study gave him a further important lesson – in 
his view electrical engineering was “about the only academic field with a solid, 
central core of theoretical dynamics” (Forrester 2007a, p. 345).
These two aspects of his character – a focus on results and on being practical 
combined with a theoretical interest in dynamics – shaped his work throughout his 
life. Two colleagues described him after his death as “faultlessly courteous. He was 
direct and unambiguous with criticism and praise. He was also hospitable and 
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 convivial, enjoying a good joke and quick to share humorous stories himself” (Lane 
and Sterman 2018, p. 96).
In 1939, Forrester moved to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he 
spent his entire career, formally retiring in 1989. His initial work was in the 
Servomechanisms Laboratory, founded by Gordon Brown who was to become his 
mentor over 50 years, “substantially responsible for helping me develop my career” 
(Forrester 1996, p. 350). Brown was Forrester’s employer as a research assistant 
during the years of the Second World War; he supervised Forrester’s Masters thesis 
(passed in 1945); and it was even through Brown that Forrester met his wife, Susan. 
Moreover, the “feedback system theory that I learned in his Servomechanisms 
Laboratory became the foundation for the field of system dynamics” (Forrester 
1996, p. 350).
Servomechanisms are mechanical devices which control the behaviour of a 
larger system through feedback. A classic example is the thermostat controlling the 
boiler of a heating system. During the war, Brown and Forrester worked on servo-
mechanisms to control the behaviour of radar antennae and gun mounts. Following 
the war, Forrester began work on the design of an early aircraft flight simulator. The 
simulator was intended to be based on an analogue computer, but ended up as one 
of the very first digital computers, Whirlwind, which in due course evolved into 
SAGE (Semi-Autonomous Ground Environment), an air defence system.
Whirlwind, for which Forrester was project leader (it began operation in 1951), 
was ground-breaking: it was the first digital computer to operate in real time and to 
use video displays for output. A further important innovation in the Whirlwind proj-
ect was Forrester’s invention of magnetic core memory, for many years the domi-
nant form of computer memory and for which he held the patent along with MIT, 
making him quite wealthy (Buck and Dey 2018). A key employee on this work was 
Ken Olsen, the founder of Digital Equipment Corporation, on whose board Forrester 
served for many years.
By 1956, Forrester felt that “the pioneering days in digital computers were over” 
(Forrester 1989, p. 4). He remained at MIT but moved to its School of Management. 
This was less of a large shift than it might seem – as head of the Whirlwind project, 
he had already experienced several years as a manager of a very large scale project, 
involving negotiation and contracting with several partner organisations. His initial 
goal in moving to the School of Management was to apply the lessons he had 
learned about technology to issues of management. In doing so he created the field 
of system dynamics.
Forrester’s first study involved fluctuations in levels of sales, inventory and 
employees in household appliances at General Electric (GE). The company was 
going through inexplicable cycles, apparently unrelated to normal business demand, 
where sometimes their workers would be terribly over-stretched and at other times 
the company would have to sack people. Forrester was able to model the cycles and 
observe that they created positive feedback loops arising from delays in interactions 
between different departments of the company. Initially he modelled these using 
paper and pencil, but he was convinced of the importance of computers for enhanc-
ing management decision-making, and as part of the project a colleague built a 
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compiler that allowed the direct entry of the feedback equations into a computer. 
This compiler later developed into DYNAMO, which was used for many years as 
the basis of simulation models within system dynamics. The model of GE’s inven-
tory control, and especially the delay between different departments, was later re- 
expressed in terms of beer production by Forrester’s graduate students and became 
the basis of a classic simulation game used in many introductory courses, the MIT 
Beer Game.
Forrester published his first results as an article in the Harvard Business Review 
(Forrester 1958), later expanded to a book (Forrester 1961) – both with the title of 
‘Industrial Dynamics’ which served as the name of the field for its first decade. As 
he presented it, the work rests on four foundations: feedback control theory, an 
understanding of decision-making processes, simulation, and the use of digital com-
puters to enable mathematical modelling. Of these, he believed the first to be the 
most important, directly arising from work on servomechanisms. He wrote that 
from this theory we learnt about “the effect of time delays, amplification, and struc-
ture on the dynamic behaviour of a system … [and] that the interaction between 
system components can be more important the components themselves” (Forrester 
1961, p. 14).
The first 10 years of work on system dynamics resulted in a solid theoretical core 
which continues to be the basis of the field to this day. In 1968, Forrester published 
a textbook which outlined the main concepts and methods of system dynamics 
(Forrester 1968a). He was very clear that SD was driven by the structure of systems 
and that the structure was described by a set of interlocking feedback loops. 
Importantly, “a model of a system is formulated by starting with the loop structure, 
not by starting with components of loops” (Forrester 1968b, p. 407). The interaction 
between these loops produces the behaviour of the system.
SD’s strong emphasis on feedback and control suggests close parallels with 
cybernetics, and indeed the early development of both approaches was largely done 
at MIT. However, it is clear from Forrester’s account that he took his understanding 
of feedback from quite different sources, largely that of servomechanisms, and had 
no connection with cybernetics. Richardson (1991) identifies two parallel threads of 
the use of feedback ideas in social sciences (the servomechanisms thread and the 
cybernetics thread) with important distinctions, placing Forrester along with a num-
ber of economists who applied feedback in their work, most notably Herbert Simon 
who later won the Nobel prize for his work on management decision-making. In 
particular, Richardson argues that those in the cybernetics thread treat feedback as a 
“tool for controlling systems in the face of [external] disturbances” while those in 
the servomechanisms thread see feedback loops “as an internal aspect of the struc-
ture of social systems” (Richardson 1991, p. 164).
In the late 1960s, Forrester and his colleagues (by then a well-established group 
at MIT) began to branch out to other fields beyond management. This was espe-
cially inspired by the outgoing mayor of Boston becoming a 1 year visiting profes-
sor at MIT, with an office next to Forrester’s. Through this contact, Forrester became 
interested in the modelling of urban issues, and was able to assemble a group of 
those who understood the nature and problems of cities. The result was a detailed 
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SD model of a city, published in the book Urban Dynamics (Forrester 1969). The 
book’s conclusion was controversial: “that all of the major urban policies that the 
United States was following lay somewhere between neutral and highly detrimen-
tal, from the viewpoint either of the city as an institution, or from the viewpoint of 
the low-income, unemployed residents” (Forrester 1989, p. 8). Its methodology was 
no less controversial – instead of drawing upon existing literature on urban plan-
ning, it worked entirely from a computer model. The book tended to polarise opin-
ions, some very positive and others very negative. The ideas in Forrester’s book 
were later taken up (in the late 1980s) as the basis for a highly successful computer 
game, SimCity, which simulated the behaviour of a number of cities and allowed 
players to control aspects of their design and management.
Forrester’s urban modelling also led directly to the most famous application of 
SD, the modelling of the world economy and ecosystem. This work was carried out 
through the Club of Rome, an informal and small group of influential people in 
business, academia and politics, founded by Aurelio Peccei, an Italian business 
executive. Learning of Forrester’s urban work, Peccei invited him to join the Club 
and to attend a meeting in Switzerland in 1970. The Club had been offered a grant 
from the Volkswagen Foundation if they could propose a clear research project to 
tackle what they called the ‘problématique humaine’: the interlocking issues of 
global population, crime, pollution, resource depletion, terrorism etc. (Kleiner 
1996). Forrester proposed the development of an SD model of these interlocking 
global issues, and invited the Club to visit MIT to explore the approach and its 
potential. The bulk of the modelling work was carried out within the MIT SD group 
by a team led by one of Forrester’s former students, Dennis Meadows. Forrester 
wrote a further book based on this work, World Dynamics (Forrester 1971) which 
was a surprise bestseller and highly controversial, even being reviewed on the front 
pages of some newspapers; the more popular book which followed, Limits to 
Growth (Meadows et al. 1972) sold still better and was still more controversial. This 
work is discussed in greater depth in the chapter on Donella Meadows. It was during 
the Club of Rome project that Forrester’s group started to use the term ‘system 
dynamics’ rather than ‘industrial dynamics’, given that the focus of the work was 
much broader than industrial applications (Meadows 2002).
The modelling work on the Club of Rome project was often criticised for the 
poor-quality data used to shape its conclusions. This was partly due, as Edwards 
(2010) argues, to a lack of availability of good-quality long-term data sources on 
issues such as pollution, industrial output and non-renewable resource use. However, 
more widely it relates to Forrester’s preference, as discussed earlier, for taking a 
structural rather than a statistical approach to modelling. In later work on a ‘National 
Model’ of the US economy, Forrester argued strongly that “inadequacies of eco-
nomic analysis can be substantially attributed to inappropriate and biased use of 
available information [such as] overemphasis on finding statistical relationships 
between economic variables and underemphasis on the internal causal mechanisms 
that produce economic behavior” (Forrester 1980, p. 555). This work on the National 
Model was the subject of a number of years of work and publications, but did not 
have the same influence as Forrester’s earlier work.
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System dynamics has had considerable impact on practical issues in the areas of 
management, urban planning and environmental change. The approach often uses a 
deeply rigorous approach, but its practical impact has been less than might be 
expected, particularly in addressing social concerns. Forrester (2007b, p. 361) him-
self asked, 50 years after the start of his work, “Why is there so little impact of 
system dynamics in the most important social questions? It is because we have not 
yet taken the steps that would earn us a role in the great issues.” In a similar vein 
10 years later, Forrester’s successor as head of the SD group at MIT, John Sterman, 
argued that “impact that leads to sustained improvement requires both effective 
implementation methods and models that yield reliable, rigorous, evidence-based 
recommendations” (Sterman 2019, p. 40).
Towards the end of his working life and throughout his retirement, Forrester 
actively pursued the use of SD in education at all levels, with a particular interest in 
teaching it to school-children. He held the view that “if begun early enough, every-
one can gain an appreciation for the complex dynamics of natural and human sys-
tems, and then use those insights to create a better world” (Lane and Sterman 2018, 
p. 96), and this approach led to the successful teaching of system dynamic model-
ling in a number of school settings (Fisher 2018).
Two other aspects of Forrester’s further development of SD are especially inter-
esting. First, he actively led a large research group at MIT for almost 50 years, dur-
ing which time the group produced almost 5000 working papers. However, Forrester 
made no attempt to create an ‘official’ version of system dynamics to the exclusion 
of others’ ideas. In fact, the ownership of SD as a field is now held by the System 
Dynamics Society, founded as an international society in 1983 and now with more 
than 1100 members in 75 different countries (at time of writing). This society holds 
an annual conference and publishes a successful journal. Forrester was its founding 
president, and is recognised and honoured as the founder of the field, but his voice 
became only one of many.
The second striking aspect of Forrester’s later work was his treatment of models. 
Computer-based modelling is central to system dynamics, and the chief criticisms 
of the field often arise from this, assuming that the models are used in a simplistic 
way. Forrester took a realist position on model-building, explicitly positioning him-
self against Peter Checkland’s interpretivist view and arguing that “in system 
dynamics, we have a set of principles, incomplete as they may be, that I believe do 
represent the actual nature of physical and social reality” (Forrester 1994, p. 250). 
There are subtler issues involved, however. As SD has developed, it has become 
clear that the modelling process is as important as the resulting model. As Sterman 
(2002, p. 521) has written, citing a much earlier paper of Forrester’s, “because all 
models are wrong, we reject the notion that models can be validated in the diction-
ary definition sense of ‘establishing truthfulness’, instead focusing on creating mod-
els that are useful … we argue that focusing on the process of modelling rather than 
on the results of any particular model speeds learning and leads to better models, 
better policies, and a greater chance of implementation and system improvement”. 
Given this attitude to modelling, Lane has argued that it is meaningless to situate SD 
as a ‘hard systems thinking’ approach; rather it has a “much more participative and 
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contingent relationship between a model and those working with it” (Lane 
2000, p. 18).
In creating system dynamics, Jay Forrester built more than a method or theory – 
he created a whole new form of thinking. While focused on computer-based model-
ling and thus expert-driven, it is highly practical and oriented towards real change 
in real situations. As Morecroft and Homer (2007, p. 20) have written, Forrester has 
“established for [system dynamics] an analytic paradigm that combines boldness 
and broad vision with rigor and depth”. In doing so he has made a great and long- 
lasting contribution.
 Reading from Forrester’s work
Forrester, Jay Wright 1975 from “Counterintuitive Behaviour of Social Systems”, in 
Chapter 14 of Collected Papers of Jay W.  Forrester. Waltham, MA: Pegasus 
Communications.
 Computer Models of Social Systems
People would never send a space ship to the moon without first testing prototype 
models and making computer simulations of anticipated trajectories. No company 
would put a new household appliance or airplane into production without first mak-
ing laboratory tests. Such models and laboratory tests do not guarantee against fail-
ure, but they do identify many weaknesses which can be corrected before they cause 
full-scale disasters.
Social systems are far more complex and harder to understand than technological 
systems. Why then do we not use the same approach of making models of social 
systems and conducting laboratory experiments before adopting new laws and gov-
ernment programs? The customary answer assumes that our knowledge of social 
systems is not sufficient for constructing useful models.
But what justification can there be for assuming that we do not know enough to 
construct models of social systems but believe we do know enough to directly rede-
sign social systems by passing laws and starting new programs? I suggest that we 
now do know enough to make useful models of social systems. Conversely, we do 
not know enough to design the most effective social policies directly without first 
going through a model-building experimental phase. Substantial supporting evi-
dence is accumulating that proper use of models of social systems can lead to far 
better systems, laws, and programs.
Realistic laboratory models of social systems can now be constructed. Such 
models are simplifications of actual systems, but computer models can be far more 
comprehensive than the mental models that would otherwise be used.
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Before going further, please realize that there is nothing new in the use of models 
to represent social systems. Each of us uses models constantly. Every person in 
private life and in business instinctively uses models for decision making. The men-
tal images in one’s head about one’s surroundings are models. One’s head does not 
contain real families, businesses, cities, governments, or countries. One uses 
selected concepts and relationships to represent real systems. A mental image is a 
model. All decisions are taken on the basis of models. All laws are passed on the 
basis of models. All executive actions are taken on the basis of models. The question 
is not to use or ignore models. The question is only a choice among alterna-
tive models.
Mental models are fuzzy, incomplete, and imprecisely stated. Furthermore, 
within a single individual, mental models change with time, even during the flow of 
a single conversation. The human mind assembles a few relationships to fit the con-
text of a discussion. As debate shifts, so do the mental models. Even when only a 
single topic is being discussed, each participant in a conversation employs a differ-
ent mental model to interpret the subject. Fundamental assumptions differ but are 
never brought into the open. Goals are different but left unstated.
It is little wonder that compromise takes so long. And even when consensus is 
reached, the underlying assumptions may be fallacies that lead to laws and pro-
grams that fail. The human mind is not adapted to understanding correctly the con-
sequences implied by a mental model. A mental model may be correct in structure 
and assumptions but, even so, the human mind – either individually or as a group 
consensus – is apt to draw the wrong implications for the future.
Inability of the human mind to use its own mental models becomes clear when a 
computer model is constructed to reproduce the assumptions contained in a person’s 
mental model. The computer model is refined until it fully agrees with the percep-
tions of a particular person or group. Then, usually, the system that has been 
described does not act the way the people anticipated. There are internal contradic-
tions in mental models between assumed structure and assumed future conse-
quences. Ordinarily assumptions about structure and internal governing policies are 
more nearly correct than are the assumptions about implied behavior.
By contrast to mental models, system dynamics simulation models are explicit 
about assumptions and how they interrelate. Any concept that can be clearly 
described in words can be incorporated in a computer model. Constructing a com-
puter model forces clarification of ideas. Unclear and hidden assumptions are 
exposed so they may be examined and debated.
The primary advantage of a computer simulation model over a mental model lies 
in the way a computer model can reliably determine the future dynamic conse-
quences of how the assumptions within the model interact with one another. There 
need be no doubt about a digital computer accurately simulating the actions that 
result from statements about the structure and policies in a model.
In some ways, computer models are strikingly similar to mental models. 
Computer models are derived from the same sources; they may be discussed in the 
same terms. But computer models differ from mental models in important ways. 
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Computer models are stated explicitly. The ‘mathematical’ notation used for 
describing the computer models is unambiguous. Computer simulation language is 
clearer, simpler, and more precise than spoken languages. Computer instructions 
have clarity of meaning and simplicity of language syntax. Language of a computer 
model can be understood by almost anyone, regardless of educational background. 
Furthermore, any concept that can be clearly stated in ordinary language can be 
translated into computer-model language.
There are many approaches to computer models. Some are naive. Some are con-
ceptually inconsistent with the nature of actual systems. Some are based on meth-
odologies for obtaining input data that commit the models to omitting major 
relationships in the psychological and human areas that we all know to be crucial. 
With so much activity in computer models and with the same terminology having 
different meanings in the different approaches, the situation is confusing to a casual 
observer. The key to success is not in having a computer; the important thing is how 
the computer is used. With respect to models, the key is not to computerize a model, 
but, instead, to have a model structure and decision-making policies that properly 
represent the system under consideration.
I am speaking here of system dynamics models – the kind of computer models 
that are only now becoming widely used in the social sciences. System dynamics 
models are not derived statistically from time-series data. Instead, they are state-
ments about system structure and the policies that guide decisions. Models con-
tain the assumptions being made about a system. A model is only as good as the 
expertise which lies behind its formulation. A good computer model is distin-
guished from a poor one by the degree to which it captures the essence of a sys-
tem that it represents. Many other kinds of mathematical models are limited 
because they will not accept the multiple-feedback-loop and nonlinear nature of 
real systems.
On the other hand, system dynamics computer models can reflect the behavior of 
actual systems. System dynamics models show how difficulties with actual social 
systems arise, and demonstrate why so many efforts to improve social systems have 
failed. Models can be constructed that are far superior to the intuitive models in 
people’s heads on which national social programs are now based.
System dynamics differs in two important ways from common practice in the 
social sciences and government. Other approaches assume that the major difficulty 
in understanding systems lies in shortage of information and data. Once data is col-
lected, people have felt confident in interpreting the implications. I differ on both of 
these attitudes. The problem is not shortage of data but rather inability to perceive 
the consequences of information we already possess. The system dynamics approach 
starts with concepts and information on which people are already acting. Generally, 
available information about system structure and decision-making policies is suffi-
cient. Available information is assembled into a computer model that can show 
behavioral consequences of well-known parts of a system. Generally, behavior is 
different from what people have assumed.
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 Counterintuitive Nature of Social Systems
Our first insights into complex social systems came from corporate work. Time after 
time we went into corporations that were having severe and well-known difficulties. 
The difficulties would be obvious, such as falling market share, low profitability, or 
instability of employment. Such difficulties were known throughout the company 
and were discussed in the business press.
One can enter a troubled company and discuss what people see as the causes and 
solutions to their problems. One finds that people perceive reasonably correctly their 
immediate environments. They know what they are trying to accomplish. They 
know the crises which will force certain actions. They are sensitive to the power 
structure of the organization, to traditions, and to their own personal goals and wel-
fare. When interviewing circumstances are conducive to frank disclosure, people 
state what they are doing and can give rational reasons for their actions. In a troubled 
company, people are usually trying in good conscience and to the best of their abili-
ties to help solve the major difficulties. Policies are being followed that they believe 
will alleviate the difficulties. One can combine the stated policies into a computer 
model to show the consequences of how the policies interact with one another. In 
many instances it emerges that the known policies describe a system which actually 
causes the observed troubles. In other words, the known and intended practices of 
the organization are sufficient to create the difficulties being experienced. Usually, 
problems are blamed on outside forces, but a dynamic analysis often shows how 
internal policies are causing the troubles. In fact, a downward spiral can develop in 
which the presumed solutions make the difficulties worse and thereby cause greater 
incentives to redouble the very actions that are the causes of trouble.
The same downward spiral frequently develops in government. Judgment and 
debate lead to a program that appears to be sound. Commitment increases to the 
apparent solution. If the presumed solution actually makes matters worse, the pro-
cess by which degradation happens is not evident. So, when the troubles increase, 
the efforts are intensified that are actually worsening the situation.
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